Pashinyan should have said in advance, “I will not sign; do not come” — Arbak Khachatryan

First Informational’s interlocutor is geopolitical analyst Arbak Khachatryan.

— Mr. Khachatryan, at the end of the CSTO summit held in Armenia, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not sign the appeal presented for support to Armenia, saying it had not been sufficiently developed. What are your observations about the meeting held in Yerevan, and what developments are possible?

— I do not think a situation is possible in which the leaders of countries agree on something and do not do it. What is the point of such a blow now? I do not think it has an external addressee; it was more a step aimed at the domestic audience. But I see dangers here. Beside us is a semi-finished state—you do not know whether it is Christian or Muslim—and the other two are Muslim. Taking such a step in this situation, I do not think, is effective; the risks have not been calculated.

What had the foreign ministers and defense ministers agreed on beforehand? I am not justifying the CSTO’s actions at all, but I want to understand the practical benefit of such an act and what new trials our nation will face. The security system has completely collapsed; what can we expect? Gather the presidents and say: “I am not signing.” I doubt that this was an agreed step, and what dangers there will be later is unknown. We have no diplomacy and no security; I truly have concerns.

— CSTO member Kazakhstan has established strategic cooperation with the United States, and Kyrgyzstan wants to move closer to NATO standards. But why is Armenia accused of being pro-Western, including, incidentally, by Armenian opposition figures?

— He could have brought NATO to Armenia and rejected the CSTO, but not invited them and then refused. I have always said: go and do it; you are an independent country. Armenia’s former presidents sold everything, we understand that—but what are you doing? If you want to be with someone else, be with them. But to increase the number of enemies and say, “I am a heroic guy”—I do not think that is effective.

— But wouldn’t it have been worse if he had signed it in that form?

— Who says he should have signed? You say in advance: “I am not going to sign; do not come.” Before that, ministers reach agreements and working groups do their work. You invite them here and do not sign—what for? Say it beforehand. You should not bring the presidents of countries to your place and take such a step. No president would have come if he had known he was going back empty-handed. That is the greatest danger. Stand up immediately and say: “We do not want the CSTO; that is it.”

— What prospects would leaving the CSTO open for us? Is it realistic to expect security support from the West?

— There were many problems with the West; work needed to be done. Look at relations between Greece and Turkey, which have reached an almost warlike situation. The 30–40 million Kurds also have problems. Under this threat, have we decided what we must do? The entire CSTO also has a hostile attitude toward us. Why are we now moving toward an even greater escalation? I cannot imagine what the foreign ministers and defense ministers had agreed on before this. If they knew they would not sign, why had they gathered?